Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry A Comment on William Riker s Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions (1980)
RELATED TOPICS
{ political theory science new social }
{ coalition game proposal government equilibrium }
{ group action cooperation collective individuals }
{ voting voters vote voter candidates }
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