Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors (1984)
RELATED TOPICS
{ group action cooperation collective individuals }
{ model equilibrium probability information utility }
{ economic model political data spending }
{ war political conflict data model }
{ political respondents support attitudes people }
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