Political Control Versus Expertise Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures (1995)
RELATED TOPICS
{ groups political public group interest }
{ coalition game proposal government equilibrium }
{ model equilibrium probability information utility }
{ economic model political data spending }
{ court committee congress house members }
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