Campaign Contributions and Access (1995)
RELATED TOPICS
{ model equilibrium probability information utility }
{ groups political public group interest }
{ court committee congress house members }
{ vote election party presidential candidates }
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting (1985)
Stacking the Deck Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design (1987)
Bureaucrats Legislators and the Size of Government (1983)
Legislators and Interest Groups How Unorganized Interests get Represented (1986)
An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics (1985)
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uniformed Voters (1994)
A Model of Muddling Through (1995)
Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences (1999)
Convicting the Innocent The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting (1998)
Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures (2000)
An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests (1998)
Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity (2000)
Money Talks Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections (1995)
Political Control Versus Expertise Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures (1995)
Agenda Control Committee Capture and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics (1986)
Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation (1987)
Buying Supermajorities (1996)
Busy Voters Agenda Control and the Power of Information (1992)
Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents (1998)
Uncertainty Shifting Power and Appeasement (1996)