Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining The Role of Agent Veto in Two Level Games (1995)
RELATED TOPICS
{ coalition game proposal government equilibrium }
{ model equilibrium probability information utility }
{ states war international military soviet }
{ war political conflict data model }
{ court committee congress house members }
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