A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs (1996)
RELATED TOPICS
{ coalition game proposal government equilibrium }
{ state political income states economic }
{ voting voters vote voter candidates }
{ group action cooperation collective individuals }
{ model equilibrium probability information utility }
{ court committee congress house members }
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