The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter What Are the Conditions A Critique of Tsebelis 1994 (1996)
RELATED TOPICS
{ coalition game proposal government equilibrium }
{ political rights social liberal democracy }
{ court committee congress house members }
{ policy issue welfare white changes }
{ political respondents support attitudes people }
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Bargaining in Legislatures (1989)
The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter (1994)
A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs (1996)
Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining (2001)
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure (1998)
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies (1996)
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules Some Amendments (2001)
Voting and Vetoing (1996)
Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios (1990)
More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter Response to the Moser (1996)
Coalitions and Cabinet Government (1990)
The Core of the Constitution (1987)
Commitment Deference and Legislative Institutions (1995)
Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments (1998)
A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems (1991)
Floor Behavior in the U S Congress Committee Power Under the Open Rule (1989)
Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States (1992)
Agendas and The Control of Political Outcomes (1987)
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections (1995)
Ordinal Preference Games An Analysis of Legislative Coalition Formation Without Transferable Utility (1984)