More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter Response to the Moser (1996)
RELATED TOPICS
{ coalition game proposal government equilibrium }
{ political theory science new social }
{ political state law machiavelli see }
{ new political american press social }
{ court committee congress house members }
{ groups political public group interest }
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Coalitions and Cabinet Government (1990)
The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter (1994)
The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter What Are the Conditions A Critique of Tsebelis 1994 (1996)
Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios (1990)
Bargaining in Legislatures (1989)
A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs (1996)
Voting and Vetoing (1996)
Floor Behavior in the U S Congress Committee Power Under the Open Rule (1989)
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power (1987)
Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining (2001)
The Core of the Constitution (1987)
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections (1995)
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies (1996)
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure (1998)
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules Some Amendments (2001)
Commitment Deference and Legislative Institutions (1995)
Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States (1992)
Replication Realism and Robustness Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade (2002)
Plausibility of Signals by a Heterogeneous Committee (2001)
Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments (1998)