Stability and Coordination in Duverger s Law A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting (1997)
RELATED TOPICS
{ voting voters vote voter candidates }
{ model equilibrium probability information utility }
{ party parties electoral government states }
{ political theory science new social }
{ vote election party presidential candidates }
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