Comparing Centralized and Decentralized Institutions A Reply to Schwartz and Tomz (1997)
RELATED TOPICS
{ group action cooperation collective individuals }
{ model equilibrium probability information utility }
{ political theory science new social }
{ voting voters vote voter candidates }
{ political rights social liberal democracy }
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