Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents (1998)
RELATED TOPICS
{ model equilibrium probability information utility }
{ voting voters vote voter candidates }
{ coalition game proposal government equilibrium }
{ group action cooperation collective individuals }
RELATED DOCUMENTS
Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures (2000)
Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity (2000)
Convicting the Innocent The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting (1998)
In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts Mistrials Communication and Strategic Voting (2000)
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty (1985)
Information Aggregation Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem (1996)
Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences (1999)
An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules (2000)
The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity (1990)
The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry (1987)
Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems (1993)
Busy Voters Agenda Control and the Power of Information (1992)
Sequential Voting With Endogenous Voter Forecasts (1990)
Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare (1999)
Political Confederation (1999)
Stability and Coordination in Duverger s Law A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting (1997)
Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation (1985)
Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation (1987)
Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation A Correction (1990)
Vote Buying Supermajorities and Flooded Coalitions (2000)