{ model equilibrium probability information utility }

WORDS
model
equilibrium
probability
information
utility
expected
case
function
type
two
distribution
proposition
value
political
assumption
assume
uncertainty
decision
equation
state
let
first
costs
figure
cost
result
game
zero
models
review
point
strategy
implies
large
positive
suppose
equilibria
science
see
theory
tion
equal
consider
time
demand
american
choice
optimal
greater
follows
values
results
higher
signal
make
private
better
note
payoff
conditions
risk
assumptions
choose
preferences
show
true
behavior
increase
level
strictly
price
proof
bias
size
assumed
new
problem
types
increases
functions
resources
vol
possible
second
informed
effect
increasing
winning
legislators
makes
benefits
marginal
beliefs
condition
interest
larger
probabilities
fact
depends
know
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